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FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE POWER TO
REGULATE RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Rebecca L. Smith
I. INTRODUCTION
In November of 1980 Washington State voters adopted Initia-
tive 383 which enacted the Radioactive Waste Storage and Trans-
portation Act of 1980. By this Act Washington sought to ban the
storage within its borders of all non-medical radioactive waste gen-
erated outside Washington, and to ban the transportation of this
type of waste to any storage site in Washington.' The Act did not
restrict transportation for storage or storage of radioactive waste
generated within Washington. Nor did it seek to ban the transpor-
tation of radioactive waste through Washington for use or storage
elsewhere. The Act purported to protect the health and safety of
Washington citizens.2 Several groups filed actions in United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington challenging
the constitutionality of the Act. The court joined these actions in
Washington State Building and Construction v. Speilman,3 in
which the court considered the plaintiffs' motions for summary
judgment.
Montana has also enacted a statute that totally prohibits the
disposal of byproduct material," special nuclear material, or large
quantity radioactive material6 within Montana.' This statute does
not distinguish between waste generated within or without Mon-
1. 1981 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CHAPrER 1, §§ 3, 4 (West).
2. 1981 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CHAPTER 1, § 1 (West). This section provides:
Transporting, handling, storing, or otherwise caring for radioactive waste presents
a hazard to the health, safety, and welfare of the individual citizens of the State of
Washington .... The burdens and hazards posed by increasing the volume of
radioactive wastes transported, handled, stored or otherwise cared for in this state
by the importation of such wastes from outside this state is not a hazard the state
government may reasonably ask its citizens to bear.
3. 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981).
4. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 75-3-103(1) (1981) defines
byproduct materials as any material made radioactive by exposure to the process of produc-
ing or utilizing special nuclear material, or tailings produced by extraction of uranium or
thorium from source material.
5. MCA § 75-3-103(10) (1981) defines special nuclear material as plutonium, uranium
or any other material which the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines
to be special nuclear material.
6. MCA § 75-3-103(6) (1981) defines large quantity radioactive material as that quan-
tity of radioactive material defined in 49 CFR 173.389(b).
7. MCA § 75-3-302 (1981). This statute excepts some byproduct material provided
that the material was being or had been lawfully disposed of within Montana upon the
effective date of the statute. 1
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tana. Another Montana statute prohibits the manufacture, use,
production or transportation of any source of radiation unless one
obtains a license to do so from the state radiation control agency.'
The City of Missoula, Montana, adopted an ordinance in 1980 that
restricts the transportation of radioactive material within the city
limits.9 In light of these laws, Montanans should take special inter-
est in the Spellman decision.
In Spellman plaintiffs contended that the Washington Act vi-
olated the supremacy, commerce, war powers and property clauses
of the United States Constitution. Since plaintiffs' attacks focused
primarily on the supremacy and commerce clauses, this discussion
will summarize the court's analysis of these clauses.
II. SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The supremacy clause provides that the laws of the United
States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority are the su-
preme law of the land.10 This clause preempts state laws to the
extent that they conflict with federal law." Although the Supreme
Court has rejected any rigid verbal formula as determinative of
preemption, the Court has developed a series of tests that courts
may use in ascertaining whether state statutes violate the
supremacy clause.
A court may find that the supremacy clause preempts a state
law when federal regulation of any subject is so detailed and perva-
sive that a reasonable person may infer that Congress intended to
preclude any state from regulating the subject. 2 A court may also
find a state law violative of the supremacy clause if it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."1 This test has evolved to include a
three-pronged inquiry: (1) pervasiveness of a federal regulatory
scheme; (2) federal occupation of the field as necessitated by the
need for national uniformity; (3) danger of conflict between state
laws and the administration of a federal program. 4 A court may
not infer that Congress intended a federal statute to supersede the
exercise of state power unless Congress has expressed a clear intent
8. MCA § 75-3-404(2) (1981).
9. Missoula, Mont., Ordinance 2104 (Feb. 4, 1980); amend. Ordinance 2181 (Dec. 22,
1980).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406 (1819).
12. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973).
13. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
14. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
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to preempt state law. 5
Several federal statutes govern the disposal and transportation
of radioactive materials. An examination of these statutes will pro-
vide a basis for a determination of whether federal regulation
preempts a state effort to regulate transportation or disposal of ra-
dioactive materials.
A. Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC)16 to regulate byproduct material' 7 and
special nuclear material.1 8 The NRC regulates most radioactive
waste since most of this waste consists of byproduct material."9
Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to enter
into agreements with the governor of any state to transfer regula-
tion of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to the
state.2" This provision and its legislative history clearly imply that
Congress intended to preempt state regulation of radioactive mate-
rial, except pursuant to a turnover agreement between the NRC
and a state.2
B. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and Department of
Energy Organization Act
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 authorizes the NRC to
license and regulate facilities of the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA) used for receipt and storage of high-
level radioactive wastes generated by ERDA research activities or
activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act. 22 The Depart-
15. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942); accord, New York
State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
16. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the old Atomic Energy Commis-
sion and transferred its functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5814,
5841 (1976, Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2114 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979). The Act defines
byproduct material as any material made radioactive by exposure to the process of produc-
ing or utilizing special nuclear material, or tailings produced by extraction of uranium or
thorium ore from source material. Id. § 2014(e).
18. Id. §§ 2071-2078. The Act defines special nuclear material as plutonium, uranium
or any other material which the Commission determines to be special nuclear material. Id. §
2014(aa) (1976).
19. See Harris C'ty, Tex. v. United States, 292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961); accord, City of
Britain, Conn. v. AEC, 308 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976).
21. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1872-83.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
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ment of Energy Organization Act gives the Department of Energy
(DOE) express authority over management, storage and disposal of
all nuclear wastes.2 s This Act also transfers functions previously
delegated to ERDA to DOE.
2 4
C. Transportation Safety Act of 1974
Title I of the Transportation Safety Act is known as the Haz-
ardous Materials Transportation Act.2 5 This Act authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to designate materials, including radi-
oactive materials, as hazardous and to issue regulations for the safe
transportation in commerce of these hazardous materials.2, This
Act also provides that the Secretary of Transportation may deter-
mine that a state law governing transportation of hazardous mater-
ials is not preempted if it affords an equal or greater level of pro-
tection to the public and does not unreasonably burden
commerce.2 7 Therefore, this Act indicates a congressional intent to
partially preempt state regulation in this area.
D. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978
This Act authorizes the Secretary of Energy to enter into
agreements with states to remedy problems associated with sites
containing residual uranium mill tailings and other radioactive
waste generated by the processing of uranium ore.28 DOE may
enter into turnover agreements with states authorizing states to li-
cense and regulate uranium mill tailings.2 9
E. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy of 1980
This Act places responsibility with each state for providing ca-
pacity either within or outside that state for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste generated within that state's borders.30 This Act
recognizes that low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and
effectively managed on a regional basis.3" In this Act, Congress au-
23. Id. § 7133(a)(8).
24. Id. § 7151.
25. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976, Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
26. Id. §§ 1803-1804.
27. Id. § 1811.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7913-7923 (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
29. Id. § 2021(o).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). The Act defines low-level radioactive
waste as radioactive waste, trans-uranic waste, spent nuclear fuel or byproduct material. Id.
§ 2021b(2).
31. Id. § 2021d(a)(1)(B).
[Vol. 43
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thorizes the states to enter into interstate compacts to provide for
establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-
level radioactive waste. 32 After January 1, 1986, any compact ap-
proved by Congress may restrict the use of regional disposal facili-
ties to low-level waste generated within the region.33
These provisions indicate a congressional intent to place re-
sponsibility for low-level radioactive waste disposal with each
state. If any state does not provide for disposal of low-level radio-
active waste generated within its borders by January 1, 1986, that
state could be denied access to other regions' disposal sites." Most
radioactive waste, however, consists of byproduct material," which
is specifically exempted from this Act. 6 Under the Atomic Energy
Act and the Department of Energy Organization Act, the NRC and
DOE maintain primary authority to regulate disposal of radioac-
tive waste.3
This web of federal law indicates a congressional intent to pre-
clude state regulation of either radioactive waste disposal or trans-
portation except when Congress has expressly ceded regulatory au-
thority to the states.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce." Under the supremacy clause, if Congress has
enacted legislation pursuant to the commerce clause, a state is pre-
cluded from enacting any conflicting legislation.3 ' In the absence of
federal legislation, the commerce clause precludes any state from
obstructing the free flow of interstate commerce unless a state law
serves a legitimate state interest and is applied in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner.40 In determining whether a state law serves a legiti-
mate state interest, the Supreme Court will balance the need for
uniform national regulation against the putative state interest.41
32. Id. § 2021d(a)(2)(A).
33. Id. §2021d(a)(2)(B).
34. Id.
35. See supra note 18.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
37. See supra notes 14, 15, 21 and 22.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851);
Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824).
40. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
41. Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945); accord, Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Line, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc., 434 U.S. 429, 440
(1978).
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The Supreme Court established standards for balancing these
interests in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 42 Under the Pike standards
the court determines: (1) as a threshold issue, whether the state
law regulates evenhandedly; (2) whether the state law effectuates a
legitimate local public purpose; and (3) whether the state law has
only an incidental effect on interstate commerce. '3 If the court an-
swers each issue affirmatively, the court will uphold the state law
unless the burden that it imposes on commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits."
A state law discriminates on its face against interstate com-
merce if it overtly blocks the flow of commerce at its borders based
on the origin of transported substances. 4 A court may invalidate a
state statute based on this facial discrimination.4 6 Even if a court
does not invalidate a statute based solely on facial discrimination,
this discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported
legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory
alternatives.47
IV. THE SPELLMAN HOLDING
In Spellman the court invalidated the Washington Act as vio-
lative of the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution, and granted plaintiffs' motions for summary
judgment.48
The court held that, under the supremacy clause, federal law
preempted the Washington Act because the pervasive federal stat-
utory schemes for regulation of radioactive waste demonstrated a
congressional intent that the "transportation and storage of all
materials which pose radiation hazards would be regulated by the
federal government except when jurisdiction was expressly ceded
to the states.
49
After finding that radioactive waste fits the definition of "com-
merce" for constitutional purposes"0 and that the Washington Act
was clearly a regulatory measure,51 the court held the Act violative
42. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
46. Id.
47. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
48. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. at 935.
49. Id. at 931.
50. Id. at 933.
51. Id.
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of the commerce clause."'
In its commerce clause analysis the court first held that since
Congress has established a pervasive scheme to regulate this area
of commerce, the supremacy clause preempted the Washington
Act.53 The court further held that even in the absence of this per-
vasive federal regulatory scheme, the Act still violated the com-
merce clause since it did not meet any of the standards established
in Pike.5 " Reviewing the Pike standards the court held that: (1) the
Act discriminated on its face since it overtly blocked the flow of
interstate commerce at Washington's borders on the basis of ori-
gin;55 (2) the Act did not effectuate a legitimate local purpose since
the defendants "failed to present evidence that non-medical radio-
active waste, transported and stored in compliance with federal
regulations, is dangerous to the health and safety of the citizens of
the State of Washington"; 56 and (3) the Act would "clearly" have
more than an incidental effect on interstate commerce since the
Act would aggrevate the national problem of reduction in radioac-
tive waste disposal sites.
V. CONCLUSION
The Spellman court had little trouble in holding the Washing-
ton Act unconstitutional, primarily because of the Act's rather bla-
tant violations of the supremacy and commerce clauses. The signif-
icance of the Spellman decision lies in its utility as a basic guide to
the constitutionality of other enactments in the area of radioactive
waste regulation. For example, although Montana's statutes in this
area differ significantly from the Washington Act, Spellman
reveals that Montana's enactments are open to similar constitu-
tional attacks. Montana law totally prohibits disposal of byproduct
material, special nuclear material and large quantity radioactive
material within Montana.58 In addition, Montana law prohibits the
manufacture, use, production or transportation of nuclear material
within Montana without a license to do so from the state radiation
control agency.09 Montana has not entered into any turnover agree-
ments with the NRC under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 934.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 935.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 7.
59. See supra note 8.
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or any other federal law transferring regulation of radioactive ma-
terial to state government.6
Courts will uphold state regulations in this area under the
supremacy clause only if a state proves that it regulates pursuant
to a turnover agreement with the NRC under the Atomic Energy
Act or pursuant to some other express authority ceded to it by
Congress. In addition, state regulations in this area will withstand
commerce clause attacks only if a state proves that the local bene-
fits of its nondiscriminatory regulations outweigh the need for uni-
form national regulation.
Since the federal government has not ceded any of its regula-
tory authority to Montana, Montana's law governing disposal of
radioactive materials probably violates the supremacy clause. But
since the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act permits the
Secretary of Transportation to determine that federal law does not
preempt a state law regulating transportation of radioactive mate-
rial,6 Montana's statute governing transportation of radioactive
materials could possibly withstand scrutiny under the supremacy
clause.
Although Montana's laws do not discriminate on the basis of
the origin of radioactive materials, courts coild find them violative
of the commerce clause unless Montana can show that the pur-
ported health and safety benefits outweigh the need for uniform
national regulation in this area.
60. Although Montana has not entered into any turnover agreements for the regula-
tion of byproduct materials, special nuclear materials or other high-level radioactive materi-
als, Montana has taken responsibility for low-level radioactive waste disposal. On November
24, 1981, Governor Schwinden signed Executive Order 29-81 which designated Montana as a
party to the Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste pursuant to
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980.
61. See supra note 27.
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